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Robert Post* 
It is a pleasure to contribute to this tenth anniversary issue 
of Constitutional Commentary, which deserves great credit for its 
support of free-ranging scholarly reflection, unfenced by the ra-
zor wire of bluebook citations. In our profession we have great 
need for such spaces of informal dialogue and unconstrained 
deliberation. 
It is in fact about our profession that I wish to meditate in 
this short essay, provoked by the painful and ill-fated nomination 
of Lani Guinier. I want to focus on a cavalier but wickedly pene-
trating remark of Senator Joseph Biden, the chair of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee that was to pass on Guinier's candidacy. 
After reading Guinier's scholarly articles, Biden said: 
If she can come up here and explain herself, convince 
people that what she wrote was just a lot of academic musing, 
who knows? ... I suppose it's conceivable that she could be 
confirmed. If she comes up here and says she believes in the 
theories that she sets out in her articles and is going to pursue 
them, not a shot.l 
Biden's comment candidly questions the social significance of 
writing that is avowedly "academic." It invites us to inquire into 
the nature of our vocation, to ask for whom and for what pur-
pose we write. 
Biden uses the adjective "academic" dismissively, evoking 
the genial condescension with which mainstream culture re-
garded intellectual "eggheads" in the 1950's: Academics are 
"theoretical," "out-of-touch," "impractical." Lost in abstraction, 
they cannot be entrusted with "real world" tasks. But of course 
anyone with any knowledge of Lani Guinier would know that 
none of these characterizations could be applied to her. She was 
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a tough, real-world, hard-driving litigator; she remains an articu-
late, hard-edged, smart, and persistent scholar. 
So Biden more probably meant his use of the word "aca-
demic" to apply not to Guinier personally, but to the genre in 
which her work appeared. He seems to have meant that law re-
view articles as a form can be dismissed as merely "academic." 
We can read Biden as establishing an opposition between the ab-
stract and impractical work of law professors who write for law 
reviews, and the real and practical work of Washington officials 
who engage in the project of law creation and enforcement. 
The question I want to pursue is how we in the legal acad-
emy ought to regard this opposition. 
* * * 
At first, of course, the answer seems obvious. No self-re-
specting group of law professors could possibly accept an image 
of their work as fumbling and incompetent, relevant only to the 
theoretical and useless arcana of the law. But certainly there is at 
least one sense in which, I expect, most of us would accept 
Biden's opposition. The purpose of legal scholarship is the 
achievement of truth, whereas the purpose of the work of Wash-
ington officials is governance. And these two purposes, as 
Hannah Arendt has had occasion to remind us in terms that 
strongly echo Biden's remark, can be deeply oppositional: 
The story of the conflict between truth and politics is an 
old and complicated one, and nothing would be gained by sim-
plification or moral denunciation. Throughout history, the 
truth-seekers and truthtellers have been aware of the risks of 
their business; as long as they did not interfere with the course 
of the world, they were covered with ridicule, but he who 
forced his fellow-citizens to take him seriously by trying to set 
them free from falsehood and illusion was in danger of his life: 
"If they could lay hands on [such a] man ... they would kill 
him," Plato says in the last sentence of the cave allegory.2 
Biden covers the law reviews with "ridicule," and by so doing re-
enacts an ancient tension. 
Truth, from the perspective of power, can seem hopelessly 
naive and dangerously ingenuous. Power, from the perspective 
of truth, can seem irredeemably corrupt and unfounded. Arendt 
helps us to see that this tension goes very deep. For truth cannot 
remain truth and yield to expediency; truth demands resistance 
2. Hannah Arendt, Truth and Politics, in Between Past and Future 227, 229 (Pen-
guin, 1978). 
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to the blandishments of this world. And, conversely, governance 
cannot yield to truth without losing the forms of interaction that 
constitute politics. "[E]very claim in the sphere of human affairs 
to an absolute truth, whose validity needs no support from the 
side of opinion," Arendt writes, "strikes at the very roots of all 
politics and all governments."3 "Seen from the viewpoint of poli-
tics, truth has a despotic character."4 
One can see the tragic consequences of this opposition 
clearly at work in the Lani Guinier case. Scholarly law review 
articles are written to reveal the truth of their subject. Academ-
ics would consider it a betrayal for an author to alter her conclu-
sions for reasons irrelevant to truth, as for example because of a 
desire to be appointed Assistant Attorney General for Civil 
Rights. Guinier's articles are thus legitimately read as expressing 
her authentic views of truth. 
Politicians, however, even when guided at their best by "an 
'ethic of responsibility,' "s always speak in ways that are con-
strained by considerations of role and expediency. It would be 
disastrous for them to be subjected to an unconditional "duty of 
truthfulness."6 And since Guinier's truth was unacceptable to 
the political world of Washington, Biden in effect invited Guinier 
to convert her truth into a form of expediency, and to 
recharacterize her writings as inauthentically constrained by the 
external requirements of academic life. The articles could be re-
jected as mere "academic musings." 
Biden thus set the repudiation of her prior truth as the price 
for Guinier's passage from the world of scholarship to the world 
of politics. Truth, however, is "despotic," and to Guinier's credit 
she found that price to be too high. The barrier between truth 
and governance proved impassable. 
* * * 
There is, however, more to be learned from the confronta-
tion between Guinier and Biden. We must ask why Guinier's 
truth proved to be so very unacceptable to Biden's Senate that 
Guinier could not even be given the opportunity to defend it. 
Guinier's truth was literally unspeakable in the halls of Congress. 
This is curious because the thrust of Guinier's scholarship was to 
proffer an interpretation of the legislative intent behind laws en-
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acted by that very Congress. Clearly Guinier had got matters 
strikingly wrong. Her misapprehension seems so very fundamen-
tal as to be incomprehensible in so smart and perceptive a 
scholar. 
Unless, of course, Guinier was never really concerned with 
the prosaic discovery of actual legislative intent at all. In fact the 
most plausible interpretation of her controversial articles is that 
they were intended to set forth the best possible interpretation of 
the Voting Rights Act. The fact that Congress did not and would 
not enact the statute Guinier had in mind was to her apparently 
irrelevant to the validity of her interpretation. In that sense her 
interpretation was utopian; it was truth crying out against history. 
The utopian impulse shares with traditional legal scholarship 
a hunger for achieving the truth about the social arrangements 
that govern us. I was struck by the special nature of this hunger 
when I was asked to guest lecture in a graduate seminar offered 
by the Berkeley humanities center on "The Historiography of the 
Subject." The seminar began by having two graduate students, 
one in English and the other in History, comment on my work. I 
had submitted articles discussing the legal constitution of the 
subject in the tort of invasion of privacy.7 Both graduate stu-
dents were proficient in the most advanced techniques of cultural 
theory. They each remarked that my work contained a great deal 
of sociology which they did not feel competent to evaluate. They 
each said that they would instead take my articles as themselves 
"texts," and they each then proceeded to practice on those texts 
the elegant and standard analytic moves of post-modem analysis. 
I was astonished. By repudiating the sociology in the arti-
cles, the students denied any concern with the "real world" in 
which they themselves lived. By flattening the articles into 
"texts," they nullified the possibility of arguments for legal re-
form. Such arguments were no longer to be engaged, but dis-
tanced, objectified, and analyzed as examples of discourse. The 
methodology practiced by the graduate students thus effectively 
erased the question, "How ought we practically to order our 
lives?" I realized at that moment how different from the tradition 
of cultural criticism was the fundamental pragmatic of my work 
as a legal scholar. 
Without the matter ever rising to consciousness, I had writ-
ten the articles guided by the unstated but central problematic of 
7. Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appro-
priation, 41 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 647 (1991); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of 
Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 957 (1989). 
1994] VOCATION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 189 
clarifying and improving the structures established by law for our 
social life. I was concerned to reveal the truth of those struc-
tures. To put the matter somewhat paradoxically, I discovered at 
that moment that I had been dedicated to uncovering the truth of 
political action conducted through the medium of law. The grad-
uate students, in contrast, were concerned to reveal the truth of 
discourse, of the possibility of the construction of human mean-
ing from language. The difference between these agendas in-
formed our vastly disparate frameworks of scholarly inquiry and 
technique.s 
From the perspective of this difference, Guinier's work falls 
comfortably within the orientation of ordinary legal scholarship. 
Guinier does not read the Voting Rights Act as an objectified 
text to be analyzed as discourse, but as a charter for governance. 
Her articles seek to reform legal practice, to reveal truths about 
how our society ought to be ordered. And yet, in a recent 
shrewd and much discussed op-ed piece, Guinier's work was 
characterized as "exalting theory over practice,"9 an indictment 
no doubt meant to allude to the accumulating charges that legal 
scholarship, particularly among "elite" law faculties, has become 
unacceptably "impractical" and "abstract. "to 
Comparing Guinier's work to that of the graduate students 
in the seminar, however, suggests that the opposition between 
theory and practice may not be a useful way to capture the most 
telling aspects of the confrontation between Guinier and Biden. 
At least when compared to our colleagues in the humanities, it is 
obvious that Guinier does care very much about practice. Per-
haps, then, a better avenue of analysis might be to pursue the 
difference between utopian and traditional forms of legal 
scholarship. 
* * * 
Traditional legal scholarship attempts to establish the mean-
ing of a statute by extrapolating the intent of the legislature 
which enacted it. Guinier's controversial work, however, makes 
no real effort along these lines. It instead attributes to the Voting 
8. For a brief discussion of an emerging style of legal scholarship that is dedicated 
to purposes similar to those of cultural theory, see my Legal Scholarship and the Practice 
of Law, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 615 (1992). For a prominent example of this alternative form 
of legal scholarship, see Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 801 (1991). 
9. Mary Ann Glendon, What's Wrong With the Elite Law Schools, Wall St. J., June 
8, 1993, at A14. 
10. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education 
and the Legal Profession, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 34, 35 (1992). 
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Rights Act what Guinier frankly considers to be its best possible 
meaning.11 This difference of technique is instructive. The 
method of traditional legal scholarship strives to maintain a con-
tinuity of interest between the legal implementation of statutes 
and the political will that enacted them. It does so because it 
conceives the truth of legal arrangements ultimately to be 
founded on the realistic possibilities of governance, and it is thus 
inclined to engage in incremental kinds of reform. Guinier's ap-
proach, in contrast, creates a potentially diremptive break be-
tween the law and coordinate political institutions. It does so 
because it conceives the truth of legal arrangements ultimately to 
be founded on the legitimacy of moral vision, and it is thus pre-
pared to use law to pursue radical reconstitutions of society. 
These differences, clearly visible in Guinier's methodology, 
capture the distinction between utopian and traditional scholar-
ship. The latter conceives law as an art of the possible. It tends to 
work within and to tinker at the margins of existing legal institu-
tions. It tends to demonstrate great solicitude for the political 
legitimacy of legal institutions and for, in Harlan Stone's words, 
the social advantages which accrue from the "continuity and sym-
metry of the law."1z Utopian legal scholarship, in contrast, tends 
to dismiss these virtues as weak and accommodationist. It strives 
for a more strenuous kind of law that will directly and uncompro-
misingly express relevant moral principles and purposes. 
Whether its orientation be toward the right or toward the left, 
utopian scholarship tends to underplay the independent legiti-
macy of legal institutions, and to value rectitude more than 
precedent. 
I mean here to be making a specifically jurisprudential, 
rather than political, distinction. The situation would have been 
quite different had Guinier framed her analysis as a frank propo-
sal for legislative amendment of the Voting Rights Act. Her 
work would then properly be understood as a petition to Con-
gress to alter the law, and Guinier would herself accordingly be 
regarded as a citizen advocating political change, albeit an excep-
tionally informed and concerned citizen. While her articles 
might thus have raised issues about the nature of her politics and 
her judgment, the question of her legal scholarship would have 
been quite secondary. 
11. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the 
Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077 (1991). 
12. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10 
(1936). 
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Her scholarship became primary, however, because 
Guinier's writing, like much published today in the law reviews, 
was implicitly addressed to judges. Its premise was that Guinier's 
view of the law, as supported and sustained by her legal scholar-
ship, was in fact the law, and that her interpretation of the Voting 
Rights Act ought therefore to be implemented by courts. The 
distinction between utopian and traditional legal scholarship is 
meant to illuminate the difference between two possible settings 
for such a claim of legal knowledge. 
Understood in this way, it is clear that traditional and uto-
pian legal scholarship differ in matters of degree. Claims to legal 
knowledge can be more or less respectful of existing legal institu-
tions; they can propose interpretations that are more or less real-
istic; they can identify moral principles that are more or less 
already immanent within legal institutions. It is instructive in this 
regard to contrast the Guinier affair with that of Robert Bork. 
Bork's proposed interpretation of the Due Process Clause was 
aggressively radical and utopian. Although he was repeatedly 
characterized as "out of the mainstream," his views were appar-
ently close enough to provoke a lively debate, the upshot of 
which was to relegate Bork's perspective to the periphery of the 
national political consensus about the meaning of the Clause. 
Guinier's proposed interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, how-
ever, was evidently too radical to provoke an analogous debate. 
Perhaps because issues of race are so highly explosive and be-
cause the margin of publicly acceptable positions is consequently 
quite constricted, Guinier's views were dismissed out of hand. 
Given the ambient political culture, we might conclude that 
Guinier's scholarship was that much more utopian. 
All legal scholarship seeks to attain critical distance. All 
legal scholarship therefore contains the potential for turning uto-
pian. The danger of traditional scholarship is that it will lose its 
critical edge, that the bracketing of fundamental political ques-
tions will modulate into a self-satisfied complacency dissipating 
any firm sense of moral direction and purpose. The concomitant 
strength of utopian scholarship lies in the intensity and clarity of 
its moral purposes. But its weakness inheres in its arrogance, in 
its potentially despotic desire to impose its own agenda on those 
who do not share it. The concomitant strength of traditional 
scholarship lies in its humility, in its respect for the political rec-
onciliation of difference and for the values of existing social 
institutions. 
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This implies, however, that utopian and traditional scholar-
ship are complementary, rather than merely oppositional. Each 
supplements and corrects the potential deficiencies .of the other. 
Yet it is also true and equally important that the two kinds of 
scholarship do not stand on identical footing. In the aftermath of 
legal realism we have no choice but to begin from the premise 
that law is ultimately an expression of a political will, and it fol-
lows from this that utopian scholarship can fulfill its promise of 
legal reformation only by radically remaking that political will 
through education or otherwise. This has several significant 
implications. 
It means, first, that utopian scholarship is arduous. It sets 
itself the daunting task of fundamentally transforming the gen-
eral political culture as that culture is expressed in already ex-
isting law. Second, utopian scholarship is dangerous because it is 
potentially filled with hubris. Its practitioners must be prepared 
to set themselves over and against the bulk of their political 
peers, and they thus stand in mortal danger of succumbing to the 
will to power. Third, to the extent that we have a stable political 
culture, utopian scholarship cannot be routinized and can only 
seldom be successful. It cannot be the stuff of ordinary, everyday 
scholarship. 
Taken together, these implications suggest that utopian 
scholarship ought not to be undertaken lightly. Borrowing the 
language of Bruce Ackerman, we might say that traditional 
scholarship is fitting for "normal lawmaking," while utopian 
scholarship should be reserved for the far rarer moments of 
"higher lawmaking."B The judgment that such an extraordinary 
moment is at hand will no doubt be affected by a range of differ-
ent factors. We can expect, for example, that specific sectors of 
the academic community will turn to utopian scholarship as they 
feel increasingly oppressed and marginalized by the ambient cul-
ture, increasingly distrustful of the opportunities of ordinary poli-
tics, and surely such alienation lies at the source of Guinier's own 
work. 
The law reviews today, however, evidence a very different 
phenomenon. The community of legal academics seems to have 
turned en masse to higher lawmaking. There is an ever-growing 
predominance of utopian scholarship in the law reviews; within 
elite schools utopian accents have almost become de rigueur. 
The coin of utopian scholarship is concomitantly debased. In-
stead of a high and serious effort to clarify and reform the pur-
13. Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 6-1 (Belknap Press, 1991). 
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poses of law, it has all too often come to seem merely political 
petulance masquerading as academic expertise. The searching 
resonance of the genre is thus denied to those who are most legit-
imately pressed to invoke it. 
* * * 
In a small way I can perceive the origins of this general turn 
toward utopian scholarship in my own teaching. Grading the fi-
nal examinations in my class on constitutional law last semester, I 
realized that for my students there was no gap, no disjunction, 
between the Constitution and their own political perspective. As 
a committed legal realist, trained to discern, question, and clarify 
the political purposes of the law, I had apparently succeeded only 
in making the law for my students utterly transparent to their 
own political will. I took some comfort in the fact that this influ-
ence would surely prove only temporary for the vast majority of 
my students who would become practitioners. Practicing lawyers 
learn quite quickly not to confuse their own political will with 
that of the larger culture, from which law properly springs. For 
this reason practicing lawyers experience the law as textured and 
resistant, rather than as transparent. 
I also realized, however, that there was no obvious mecha-
nism to convey this message to those few of my students fated to 
become academics. In fact all our academic assumptions point in 
the opposite direction. Legal realism has taught us to see legal 
institutions as instruments of policy. We thus see law as always 
immanently susceptible to reform on the basis of the best possi-
ble policy perspectives, which of course we each strive to articu-
late. We are therefore drawn to the development and 
clarification of the purposes that ought to direct the law. When 
we address our resulting analyses to courts, and when we conse-
quently propose our conclusions as characterizations of what the 
law is and how it ought to be implemented, we verge toward uto-
pian scholarship. Only rarely and occasionally does a Joseph 
Biden come along and remind us, as he did on the occasion of the 
nominations of both Guinier and Bork, that law serves the com-
munity's purposes, and that these purposes are the prerogative of 
common citizenship and not the preserve of academic expertise. 
Surprisingly, Biden's rap on the knuckles startled me into a 
wholly different picture of law. Instead of seeing law as an in-
strument of policy, I began to imagine it as an institution situated 
in a field of competing policies and purposes. Many of the his-
torical practices of legal institutions, which had before always 
seemed to me so obscurantist, suddenly became visible as mecha-
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nisms designed to accommodate and reconcile these political dif-
ferences, without thereby losing the fact of these differences. 
This realization in turn began to cloud the transparency of law, 
which now appeared to me clothed with the independent charac-
teristics necessary to achieve this distinctive function. Indeed, I 
began to think that legal institutions truly subject to the direction 
of a single unitary will would scarcely be recognizable, and that 
this was an important meaning of the principle that even the sov-
ereign is subject to the rule of law. 
It also occurred to me that this alternative image of the law 
has natural affinities with traditional legal scholarship. If legal 
institutions are not transparent to political will, understanding 
their distinctive function surely can sustain a legitimate academic 
expertise. That expertise would have little to do with claims of 
special competence in the ascertainment and articulation of the 
larger political purposes which ought to be brought to bear on 
legal institutions. In fact such claims, if pressed as morally com-
pulsory, might even be suspect, because they are in tension with 
the basic function of law to sustain the continued possibility of 
political difference. 
The clarification and reform of political will would thus 
properly be allocated to the competence of the general citizenry, 
from which the legal scholar would not be excluded, but as to 
which she could not speak with the special prerogatives of exper-
tise. Legal scholarship would ordinarily focus rather more nar-
rowly on the operation of legal institutions, and from this would 
follow many of the familiar characteristics of traditional legal 
scholarship: a certain incrementalism, a certain conservative re-
spect for the independent value of law, a certain sense of holding 
at bay fundamental questions and working instead within a field 
of political purposes that are already more or less given. 
The contrast with utopian scholarship, while a matter of de-
gree, is nevertheless palpable. As an heir of legal realism, uto-
pian scholarship understands the basic function of law to be the 
reflection and accomplishment of political purposes. It thus de-
mands of its adherents engagement precisely with these pur-
poses, and yet it also offers no justification for claiming scholarly 
expertise with respect to the ascertainment and advocacy of these 
purposes. The upshot is that a misfortune like that which befell 
Lani Guinier was simply waiting to happen. 
Guinier came to Washington bearing her truths about the 
nature of race relations in America and presenting those truths 
under the sign of academic expertise. On closer inspection, how-
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ever, that expertise ultimately proved to rest on the kind of polit-
ical perspective appropriate to the citizen, and so the 
prerogatives of the expertise were abruptly dismissed. The re-
sulting shock that ran through the community of legal scholar-
ship could only have been due to our failure adequately to 
distinguish between our quest for the truth of legal institutions 
and our quest for the truth of political ordering. We had not 
quite understood how different was the footing along each of 
these paths. 
The peremptory dismissal of the substance of Guinier's 
truths was also a difficult lesson for the profession. Ensconced in 
the narrow world of law reviews, we are apt to forget Arendt's 
harsh warning of the tension between truth and politics. We are 
apt to confuse our truth with power. We were therefore both 
unprepared for and galled by the reminder that in Washington 
truth rightly does not command political opinion, even truth 
about politics. 
Now, in the sober and chastened light of hindsight, we may 
perhaps begin to think once again about these and other aspects 
of our collective vocation. 
